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                                                 INTRODUCTION 
A distinguishing feature of industrial relations in the United Kingdom is that, prima facie, 
collective agreements between trade unions and employers are not legally binding as it is 
presumed the parties do not intend the agreement to be legally enforceable. This principle was 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ford Motor Co Ltd v AEUW1 and later put into statutory 
form by s.179(1) Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992.  Although 
collective agreements are not ordinarily of any legal significance between employer and union, 
if they are translated into a contractual relationship between employer and employee, then they 
can have legal force at the individual level as a term of the contract of employment. To assume 
contractual validity the relevant clauses of the agreement must be incorporated into the contract 
of employment expressly or impliedly and must be of an individual nature; capable of being 
legally binding between the employer and the employee as an individual term. George v 
Ministry of Justice (George) is the latest case where the Court of Appeal has examined the 
factors that should be taken into account in determining when the terms of a collective 
agreement are incorporated into a contract of employment and when such a term is “apt” for 
incorporation.   
                                                          
1 [1969] 2 QB 303. 
                                                      THE FACTS 
The crux of this case was a dispute between the trade union (the Prison Officers Association) 
and the employer (now the Ministry of Justice, previously the HM Prison Service) over the 
incorporation of a term of a collective agreement in prison officers’ contracts relating to 
overtime provisions. With a view to amending a number of working practices lengthy 
negotiations had taken place between HM Prison Service and the Prison Officers’ Association 
over a number of years in the 1980’s resulting in a detailed agreement (known as Bulletin 8) 
between the parties in 1987. The particular provision in dispute, paragraph 23 of Annex A to 
Bulletin 8, replaced paid overtime with “Time Off  In Lieu” (TOIL) - prison officers who 
worked over their normal 39 hour week would be entitled to TOIL for the excess hours worked. 
The relevant part of paragraph 23 in dispute stated:  “Group managers should ensure that 
individual members of staff do not work high levels of additional hours without being 
compensated by TOIL. The aim should be for no more than five additional hours to be 
accumulated in any one week. Accumulated TOIL will be granted as soon as operationally 
possible and within a maximum period of five weeks.” 
   The claimant appealed against the dismissal of his claim for breach of contract when, after 
working the additional overtime, the employer had failed to offer him TOIL within the 5 weeks’ 
time period outlined in paragraph 23.  Judge Wood QC in the county court had held that the 
failure of the employer to comply with this requirement was not legally significant as there was 
insufficient documentation adduced in evidence to conclude that paragraph 23 had been 
expressly incorporated into the claimant’s contract of employment. Wood J, nevertheless, did 
determine that a general obligation to grant TOIL was arguably incorporated by implication as 
a custom and practice; as payment for overtime was a recognised practice for a number of years 
and so clearly understood by both parties to be contractually binding. However, as there was 
no continuous provision of TOIL within 5 weeks as required by paragraph 23, this specific 
time frame was not legally inferred. 
                               THE DECISION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Rimer LJ (who gave the only reasoned judgment) 
found that paragraph 23 had not been incorporated by express reference as the claimant was 
unable to produce his original letter of appointment or written particulars of employment or 
any other documentation addressed to him that expressly introduced Bulletin 8 (and therefore 
paragraph 23) into his terms and conditions. A later standard form letter had been sent to 
employees that made express reference to Bulletin 8 and additionally referred to TOIL 
provisions in the staff handbook.  Rimer LJ, however, rejected the letter’s significance as the 
provisions in the staff handbook did not form part of the contract of employment and the failure 
to provide evidence that George had actually received the letter was fatal to the claim that 
Bulletin 8 had been expressly incorporated into his contract. 
   As there was no direct evidence of express incorporation paragraph 23 could only be 
incorporated by inference; the basis for which was an intention by both parties to be bound by 
that provision. Counsel for George submitted that the extensive negotiations on the particular 
wording of this paragraph prior to agreement was part of the factual background that should be 
considered when determining the intention of the parties – justifying the conclusion that the 
parties implicitly intended paragraph 23 to be legally binding at the individual level and 
therefore enforceable as a term of the contract.  Rimer LJ, however, rejected Counsel’s 
submissions. The negotiations prior to the subsequent collective agreement were only one 
source of the evidence of the intention of the two parties and ultimately insufficient to justify 
implied incorporation. 
   Rimer LJ also explicitly overruled the decision of the county court that TOIL had been 
impliedly incorporated by custom and practice.  Rimer LJ applied the test from the judgment 
of Hobhouse J in Alexander v Standard Telephones2  - that intent can be implied from both 
parties knowledge of the relevant clause of the agreement and subsequent compliance with that 
provision, particularly where it has a day to day impact. Rimer LJ noted that TOIL, as 
compensation for additional hours, had been operating for a number of years since Bulletin 8 
had been agreed in 1987, but as it was not always the case that TOIL was granted within five 
weeks this was an inadequate level of compliance to satisfy the test for TOIL per se to be an 
enforceable custom of employment.  
   Of greater significance was Rimer LJ’s view that even if paragraph 23 was intended by the 
parties to be enforceable it was not “apt” for incorporation – it was not the type of clause that 
was capable of incorporation as an individual term. The proviso that leave should be available 
within a 5 week period was a mere ‘aspiration or target’; non-binding guidance on the issue of 
when TOIL would, in normal operational circumstances, be granted.  Rimer LJ came to this 
conclusion by taking account of the generalised language of paragraph 23 and its associated 
provisions and by the fact that paragraph 23 was contained in a staff handbook ostensibly 
dedicated to “policies and procedures”. Furthermore, Rimer LJ noted that paragraph 23 
required TOIL to be provided without taking account of the efficient functioning of the Prison 
service. Counsel for the employer’s observation that if paragraph 23 was applied literally, as 
an unqualified contractual obligation, it would have “catastrophic” operational consequences, 
informed his conclusions that such a clause was not legally binding as it was in practice 
unworkable and thus “... inconsistent with the parties likely intention”. 3 
                                                          
2  [1991] IRLR 286 at para 27. 
3 George v Ministry of Justice [2013] EWCA 324 at para 60. 
                                                      COMMENTARY 
The Court of Appeal in George has followed a form of interpretation of the principles of 
incorporation that has implications for the drafting of collective agreements and their impact 
at the workplace.  
   In determining that the standard form letters referring to the TOIL provisions were not 
significant, the court had arguably failed to construe the documents in context - by reference 
to the detailed negotiations prior to the agreement on paragraph 23 which provides evidence of 
an intention by both parties to be bound by its content.  Furthermore, in determining the issue 
of whether the clause had been incorporated by inference, although Rimer LJ had quoted 
extensively and approvingly from the judgment of Hobhouse J in Alexander v Standard 
Telephones4 he had arguably failed to fully apply the principles from this judgment to the facts 
in George. TOIL was an issue of day-to-day relevance (relating to wages and time off) and 
over a number of years the Bulletin 8 TOIL provisions (stemming from the bargaining process) 
had been substantially followed.  To determine that an aspect of detail of the TOIL provisions 
contained in Bulletin 8 was not incorporated by inference because it had not been followed in 
absolute terms seems an overly restrictive approach to the principles of implied incorporation 
by custom and practice. 
   Of greater concern is Rimer LJ’s decision that paragraph 23 was not “apt” for incorporation. 
Some aspects of Bulletin 8 were clearly aspirational and not appropriate for incorporation; 
including the first two sentences of paragraph 23. However, the final sentence of paragraph 23 
was clear and specific in its language and not a vague policy orientated clause but one on pay 
that affected employees on a daily basis. As the wording of the clause was clear and transparent 
                                                          
4 [1991] IRLR 286. 
and was not on an issue that was solely of collective interest and relevant only to the 
union/employer relationship it ought to have been considered as “apt” for incorporation.   
   The Court of Appeal’s decision in George continues the modern trend of the Court of Appeal 
to emphasise the relevance of the impact of incorporation when assessing whether the clause 
is capable of incorporation.  An earlier example of this approach is demonstrated in Malone v 
British Airways plcs5 where the disputed clause in the relevant collective agreement prescribed 
in detail the minimum number of cabin crew to be allocated to specific aircraft. Although the 
Court of Appeal accepted that the clause in dispute was a clear undertaking, it was held that 
the employer’s unilateral reduction of crew members for individual aircraft below the number 
outlined in the collective agreement did not amount to a breach of the individual contract of 
employment - it was merely an undertaking to the union as a collective body and so not “apt” 
for incorporation.  The Court of Appeal declared that the parties could not have intended for 
the clause to be individually enforceable – taking into account that it could result in grounded 
flights and “… the disastrous consequences for British Airways which would ensue”.6   
   This method - of determining the aptness of a clause based on its practical effect - may be a 
technique to avoid unfortunate consequences for an employer but it is difficult to see how it 
can be supported by the application of principle. Case law undoubtedly holds that recognition 
or facility agreements7 are unsuited to incorporation as they are areas of concern to the union 
collectively, as are documents of a general policy nature; for example, on long term redundancy 
or training issues8 or clauses in an agreement that are too vague.9 In all these circumstances the 
parties would not intend or expect to be bound at the individual level. However, if the clause 
                                                          
5 Malone v British Airways plc [2011] IRLR 32. 
6 Malone v British Airways plc [2011] IRLR 32 at para 62. 
7 Gallagher v Post Office [1970] 3 All ER 712. 
8 British Leyland v McQuilken  [1978] IRLR 245. 
9 Lee v GEC Plessey Telecommunications [1993] IRLR 383. 
is sufficiently individual in scope; on a substantive issue, such as pay, hours of work or other 
such term expected in a contract of employment, it is prima facie suitable for incorporation10 
unless there is plain evidence that the parties did not intend the clauses to have legal effect. 
   In George (as in Malone), the provision in dispute was an issue of an individual nature; 
unrelated to any collective issue. The evidence of intention of both parties to treat paragraph 
23 as enforceable (the clear and specific language, the enforcement of related clauses and the 
evidence of the negotiation surrounding the agreements) was given little emphasis by the Court 
of Appeal. What was given emphasis and taken into account when construing the intention of 
the parties was not the prior negotiations and the surrounding documentation but the 
organisational and operational implications of the provision. This arguably more subjective 
analysis in determining whether the parties intended legal consequences to flow from the 
provision does not, on the face of it, comply with the principles of contractual construction.11   
   One conclusion that can be derived from the decision in George (and the earlier Malone case) 
is that clauses that are detrimental to employers’ interests are less “apt” for incorporation than 
clauses that are not. These cases suggest that the courts are entitled to look behind the express 
obligations in a collective agreement and that terms stemming from collective agreements are 
worthy of greater scrutiny than other contractual documents. Decisions like George thus 
arguably undermine the process of collective bargaining as an effective means of regulating 
workplace issues and determining terms and conditions of employment. In the future those 
involved in union-employer negotiations need to ensure that the results of negotiations are very 
                                                          
10 National Coal Board v National Union of Mineworkers [1986] IRLR 439; Kaur v MG Rover Group [2005] IRLR 
40. 
11 The principles of construction relating to collective agreements were succinctly outlined by Sir Thomas 
Bingham MR in Adams v British Airways plc [1996] IRLR 574 at para 22 – “..a collective agreement must be 
construed like any other agreement …  construed in its factual setting as known by the parties at the time”. 
clearly expressed as definite undertakings so that they can withstand the sort of rigorous 
contractual analysis demonstrated by George and Malone. 
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